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An intellectual Anomaly:
Hegelians in Nineteenth-Century America
It was early fall in St. Louis in 1865, Denton Snider 
recalled, when he chanced to meet an acquaintance who invited 
him to a philosophical discussion on the following Sunday. 
Snider, always eager to further his own intellectual 
development, accepted warmly, and a few days later the two 
men "rode in the horse car to Salisbury street,”1 Snider 
evidentally never suspecting that this rather innocuous 
gathering would prove to be his initiation into the all- 
consuming mysteries of the German philosopher Georg W. F. 
Hegel. The meeting convened at the home of William Torrey 
Harris, who capably read from a translation of Hegel's 
History of Philosophy. But the star of the evening was 
neither Harris nor Hegel but rather the "primal Titanic 
demiurge”2 Henry C. Brokmeyer, who sporadically interjected 
"lightning, which would flash a sudden illumination over the 
heights and into the depths of that to me new and misty 
world."3
For Snider, a self-styled "Writer of Books," life was 
art, and system ubiquitous. A simple social gathering thus 
acquired dramatic overtones, and the two men who would become 
the intellectual anchors of the St. Louis Hegelian revival 
thus exhibited diametrically opposed characteristics which
would later, in keeping with the pattern of Hegel#s triadic 
dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, become 
integrated in a greater whole. (As to whether Brokmeyer 
represented the “positive” thesis and Harris the “negative” 
antithesis or vice-versa, Snider remained silent.) The 
“Yankee” Harris, “pale, nervously twitching, thin-cheeked and 
seemingly thin-blooded....with a sharp face and rather 
pointed nose,” was for Snider nevertheless “a needle that 
could prick keenly and deeply into things.” The German 
Brokmeyer, on the other hand, was a “striking figure,” who 
sported “an enormous nose...which had the power of flattening 
and bulging,” but who could nonetheless "re-create 
Hegel...even poetize the latter's dry, colorless abstractions 
in a many-tinted display of metaphorical scintillations.”4
For all of Snider's attention to the personalities 
behind the St. Louis Philosorhieal Movement, the fundamental 
basis for this western interest in Hegel was Hegel's 
philosophy itself. At the time of Snider's propitious 
gathering in 1865, Americans had finally comprehended the 
damage inflicted by the Civil War, a conflict that not only 
had devastated much of the nation and exacted a terrible 
price in human life, but also had threatened the very roots 
of an American identity. St. Louis, a border community, was 
acutely aware of the division between North and South. But
St, Louis had also emerged from the Civil War stronger than 
ever, and seemed positioned to take over the leadership of 
the American "West,11 as it was then seen. How could St*
Louis philosophers overcome the legacy of America's divisive 
past and still remain optimistic about the future?
The English intellectual tradition of Lockean empiricism 
and Spencerian materialism, while expressing the real and 
concrete, had dismissed the ideal and the speculative as too 
subjective. Conversely, the Transcendentalists, although 
firm in their belief that man had the ability to rise above 
his surroundings and comprehend the Truth, were of little 
help in offering a means of grappling with the experiences of 
war. Hegel, howeve., seemed to be both relevant to the 
current environment and able to address the spirit of man.
His triadic dialectic allowed opposing forces to combine in a 
greater unity than that which had existed before. A negative 
incident was thus not permanent, but rather a step, and even 
a necessary step, toward a future synthesis. Hegel 
exemplified progress, even sanctioned it. With a Hegelian 
philosophy Westerners could put the past behind them, 
remaining optimistic and confident that they were headed 
toward an even better future.
But although Hegel held a special attraction for the St. 
Louis Philosophical Society as Snider's Mantiseptic11 for the
time, German idealism was by no means restricted to St*
Louis# Societies dedicated to the study of such Germans as 
Kant, Hegel, Goethe, and Schiller sprang up like so many 
weeds across the fertile Western prairie. Hiram K. Jones, 
for example, although no Hegelian, could rightly be called 
the most famous citizen of Jacksonville, Illinois, because 
his neo-Platonic society achieved such notoriety among 
idealists that for a brief moment that city was spotlighted 
as "the Athens of the West."5 Sister societies to the St. 
Louis Movement actually formed in the unlikely locales of 
Quincy, Illinois and Osceola, Iowa.6 And preceding the Civil 
War, decades before the formal convening of Snider's St.
Louis Philosophical Society, American and German-American 
intellectuals in Ohio were indefatigable in pursuing the 
finer points of German metaphysics.7
One such intellectual, Johann Bernhard Stallo, emigrated 
to Cincinnati in 1839 at age sixteen and later gained 
prominence in Ohio both as a judge and as an influential 
representative of the German community. He eventually 
achieved national recognition, serving as United States 
minister to Italy. Stallo led a successful public life, but 
philosophy remained his chief interest.8 In his General 
Principles of the Philosophy of Nature (1848), Stallo 
presented the philosophical systems of the Germans Schelling, 
Oken, and Hegel. While acknowledging that the speculative in
America was "perfectly disavowed (sometimes justly, perhaps), 
and the very worst passport which a naturalist could carry 
about him is that of a metaphysician,1,9 he nonetheless hoped 
that his book would provide Americans with a more accurate 
understanding of the way the Germans had connected philosophy 
and nature. If Snider had looked to Hegel alone to formulate 
a system for the American West, then Stall© saw him as a 
product of a larger German cultural element. Stalio's next
work, thep_ri.es .Physics (1881), was an
important study in the philosophy of science. The work was, 
surprisingly enough, much appreciated by the logical 
positivist Ernst Mach.10
The tfeggllflJD.Attraction
In retrospect, it seems curious that both Snider and 
Stallo were so intensely interested in the writings of Hegel, 
who was universally regarded by their contemporaries as 
amazingly dense. George Bancroft, for instance, who sat 
through some lectures given by Hegel in Germany in 1820, 
referred to them as a "display of unintelligible words" and 
soon quit attending class.11 The venerable Ralph Waldo 
Emerson similarly remarked, "I always test an author by the 
number of single good things which I can catch up from his 
pages. When I fish in Hegel, I cannot get a bite; in
addition the labor is so hard in reading him, that I get a 
headache.M12 Snider, who seemed proud that Hegel's Larger 
Logic had "the reputation of being the hardest book in the 
world,"13 recalled Emerson's statement with some asperity! 
"surely the implication was that we were on the wrong track, 
that it would he better for us to study Emerson than 
Hegel."** But Hegel's fame as an inscrutable thinker was in 
fact one of his greatest charms: to Westerners like Snider,
flush with a newly-discovered post-Civil War confidence,
Hegel presented an intellectual challenge which they felt 
they were more than able to meet. If an eastern 
"institution" such as Emerson did not have the energy to 
devote to Hegel# then so much the better.
Here significantly, however, Hegel's ideas fit the 
Westerners' evolving self-image. Like all philosophers he 
addressed the basic dilemma of how to integrate the self into 
the environment. But Hegel, through his triadic dialectic of 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, could resolve in a higher 
unity the lingering postwar inconsistencies that were 
especially apparent to Westerners.15 Hegel's dialectic 
challenged Kant's fundamentally negative conclusion that all 
objective knowledge was phenomenal, and thus it sanctioned 
western optimism.16 He spiritualized the West by providing 
an impressive philosophiea! arsenal against a Spencerian- 
provoked "engul f iiif materialism and invidious agnosticism.1,17
In Hegel, the fixed state existed only as it related to 
motion, for it was impossible to define "fixed*' without using 
"absence of motion." Change was natural, indeed 
unavoidable.18 To the West, a region that considered 
progress its exclusive domain, Hegel understandably proved a 
worthy spokesman.18
The Speculative "Organon of Hegel"20
Speculative philosophers like Hegel who supplied this 
sense of process to a continuous, spiral development did so 
through fully utilizing the philosophical conception of the 
word "negative." Hegel stated that the first stage of 
consciousness consisted of sensuous knowing, or of 
recognizing objects by themselves. But in the process of 
noting the uniqueness of the object, the object would 
necessarily be reduced to its characteristics. A pebble 
lying in the sand would thus become a certain color, texture, 
and size— but nothing else. This second stage Hegel referred 
to as the "negative." In the first issue of the Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy (1867), America's earliest periodical 
devoted to the study of philosophy, Harris wrote, "For if 
this stone exists only through its relations to the sun, 
which is not the stone but something else, then the being of 
this stone is its own negation."21
7
8The so-called speculative leap consisted of the third 
stage, of fashioning the "positive" out of the "negative."
If an object existed only in its "negative" relation, then 
everything would be by definition "negative." But to exist, 
the "negative" itself would have to be relative, because 
everything is relative. Harris wrote:
The most wonderful side of this, is the fact that since 
this relation is that of the negative, it negates itself 
in its very relation, and hence its identity is a 
producing of non-identity. Identity and distinction are 
produced by the self-same process, and thus self- 
determination is the origin of all identity and 
distinction likewise.22
Hegel could therefore write in summary that "That which has 
the form of Being is the self-related." In the higher forms 
of negation, in universals, the "negative" would act against 
itself to form a "process." Harris gave the example of a 
species' survival which was independent of individuals' 
deaths. "And this negation or particularization continually 
proceeds from one object to another," he wrote, "and remains 
conscious under the whole."23 (Speculative philosophers had 
at long last found in Harris's journal a forum where the 
double negative was acceptable!) Each part, every individual 
thing, reflected the greater Whole to a certain degree.
Such conceptions did not come easily to anyone, and 
Snider humorously related his early attempts at understanding 
Hegel by the following statement:
9It flung me right at the start into the most abstract 
swirl of human thought: Being, Nothing, Becoming.
These conceptions would run into one another, then out 
of one another, then make a ring around together, like a 
vast Hegelian vortex in which I was dizzily whirled, 
till I feared me [sicj I would never get out of that 
spiritual maelstrom....Hamlet stands fixed from start to 
finish in the dualism of his famous soliloquy: to be or
not to be. That was his question, he declares, but it 
was only a part of mine.”**
The Search lor^Syst^m
If Snider was in fact parochial and devotion to Hegel 
symptomatic of more than just St. Louis civic pride, it 
becomes much more problematic to assess the degree to which 
this surge of Hegelian interest was related to a renewed 
western awareness of the German cultural element. Germans, 
who concentrated in western cities like Snider's St. Louis 
and Stallo's Cincinnati, naturally sought a proportionate 
input in the unfolding American culture. As Americans and 
German-Americans alike considered philosophy the natural 
realm of the Germans, they nurtured Hegel in western soil.
But if the system that could express the western environment 
was itself transported from Germany, it was nevertheless to 
be deciphered by Americans, and through this action, it would 
become the property of the American West. Harris tellingly 
wrote in the preface to the first issue of the Journal of
10
Speculative Philosophy, "after all it is not 'American 
thought' so much as American thinkers we want.”25
For both Snider and Stallo, the quest to understand 
Hegel was fundamentally individualistic. Hegel provided the 
lexicon whereby subject and object, nature and mind, could be 
united in an Absolute, and each of these men, following the 
advice of Harris, set out with a vengeance to construct for 
himself just such a unity. For Snider, external events 
became perfect reflections of his internal search for a 
Hegelian-based system, and the triadic dialectic was 
everywhere evident. Although Snider appreciated German 
culture, it would never become crucial to his developing 
Weltanschauung. Stallo, however, who had been born in 
Germany, was much less likely than Snider to see external 
events through Hegelian-tinted lenses. Trained in the 
complexities of metaphysical terminology, Stallo would 
doubtless have seen such an action as an oversimplification. 
For Stallo, the search for an individual system was 
inextricably bound to his sense of self, and Hegel thus 
became indivisible from the German spirit.
The "Writer of Books" in His Youth
Born on an Ohio farm in 1841, Denton Snider spent the 
years following his mother's death in 1847 tossed about from
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relative to relative, landing finally in a rather strict 
Quaker school which, as Snider himself related, "began that 
distaste for going to church which has accompanied me through 
life."26 Following an intensive study of Latin and Greek at 
Oberlin College and already exhibiting the intellectual 
energy which would become so characteristic of the St, Louis 
Movement, Snider entered his so-called "Romanism phase," 
learning Spanish, Italian, and French so as to better 
understand the Latin character. Snider had a penchant for 
internal organization, and in his autobiography, he presented 
his entire life as a series of "phases." This "epoch of 
extreme linguistic ambition" lasted only two years, when 
Snider, his financial resources all but exhausted, accepted a 
position in 1864 as a Latin and Greek instructor in St. 
Louis.27 His developing interest in philosophy soon brought 
him in contact with the German intellectuals in the city, and 
Snider moved to a German boarding house, even jesting that he 
"wound up this part of my Germanization by a German 
marriage.1,28
During this time, Snider regularly attended Harris's 
German-translation study groups, and in the fall of 1866 
became an assistant in Brokmeyer's law office, not out of any 
desire to enter the legal profession, but rather so that he 
could reap the benefits of the "University Brokmeyer."2^ The 
St. Louis Philosophical Society itself had formed the
preceding January, with Brokmeyer serving as the first 
president and Harris as secretary. Although members did not 
envision that the society would be exclusively devoted to 
Hegel, a principal goal had been to translate his Larger 
Logic. Membership was open to men of every class, but 
potential members had to demonstrate their "eligibility to 
participate in the life of pure thought."30 More 
specifically, this meant that everyone, even Snider, had to 
translate some of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature as a rite of 
passage.31 Twenty-one men formed the nucleus of the group, 
and together wrote 229 books over twenty years, not counting 
Harris's 419 titles.32
The St. Louis Mission
In both k Writer of Books (1910) and TheSt, Louis 
Movement (1920), Snider proclaimed that the current state of 
post-civil War darkness and chaos would be challenged by 
Hegelian order mediated through the two mental giants, Harris 
and Brokmeyer, who, although differing in appearance and 
presentation, were nonetheless privy to the secrets of the 
master. The result of their efforts, Snider continued, would 
be a synthesis of a greater St. Louis within the context of 
world history. The environment had to be made to fit this 
system, and Snider thus began by illustrating how an Hegelian
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sense of progress applied to St. Louis and, by extension, to 
the West and the world. He acknowledged the movement's 
cultural affinities to the Germans, but nonetheless insisted 
that it was unique. Because Snider's primary mission was to 
create an identity for the American West, and to place 
himself within this development, the movement's German roots 
were likely much less threatening to him than any potential 
connection to the eastern Transcendentalists would have been. 
Thus Snider wrote that if Brokmeyer and the Transcendentalist 
Bronson Alcott would ever engage in a philosophical joust, 
poor Alcott would leave Mnot a philosophic grease-spot."33
Snider's Hegelian system was inextricably bound to St. 
Louis civic pride, which rested, unfortunately, on the 
unsound foundations of a "Great Illusion.*' St. Louis had 
emerged from the Civil War a seemingly invincible metropolis, 
ready for world dominance. Whereas the East was tired, Union 
forces of the West had not even lost a major battle, and the 
particular success of the St. Louis Germans in securing their 
city by seizing the arsenal at Camp Jackson proved an 
additional source of pride, according to Snider;
They [the population] seemed animated with the spirit of 
the Camp Jackson deed, which marked a new turning-point, 
even if very local and minute, in the World's History.
A vast hope lay in the time, in the city, and 
particularly in the Philosophical Society, which 
proposed to reconstruct the whole universe after some 
model now dimly evolving in St. Louis, and certainly not 
altogether transmitted from the Past.34
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The census of 1870 misled the population into expecting 
additional success, and furthermore, the Chicago fire of 1871 
seemed to have eliminated St. Louis's only competition for 
dominance as the major metropolis in the West. Snider, 
seeing St. Louis as symptomatic of Hegel's philosophy, 
subscribed completely to the logic that brought forth 
Brokmeyer's gleeful announcement that "Chicago was the 
completely negative city of our West and indeed of our time, 
and now she has carried out her principle of negation to its 
final universal consequence? she has simply negated 
herself."35 Only in 1880 did St. Louisians realize that 
their northern nemesis Chicago had retaken the lead (and 
indeed had never lost it). Snider wrote that the dates of 
the Philosophical Society, 1866-1885, roughly paralleled the 
golden years of St. Louis, brought to an end with the census 
of 1880 and the ensuing "Great Disillusion."36
In fact, Snider's belief in external manifestations of 
Hegel's triadic dialectic was so firm that he was convinced 
that every event had significance. On the construction of 
the Eads Bridge in 1867, Snider exclaimed, "There! Behold 
now God's Thought creating the world, even embodied in one 
little man? see your gossamer abstractions turning concrete 
and practical? and just watch your Hegel's Logic with its 
intricate fine-spun web of Pure Essences realizing itself in
15
yonder structure with all its turns, nodes, iron rods and 
braces.1,37 The dialectic even crept into his writing, as 
when Snider declared that "the West did the great positive 
act of preserving the Union.*'38 When Snider admitted, "All 
that I had ever known or done I Hegelized with a sort of 
desperation,"39 he was not far from the truth.
The St. Louis Ph ilosophical Soc iety and the.Gormans
Snider's chronicle of the roots of the M .  Louis 
Movement began in earnest with his arrival to the city in 
1864, when he said he immediately noticed the presence of 
four distinct cultural elements: the Catholic, the New
England, the Southern, and the German. If the New Englanders 
were interested in education, for instance, the Southerners 
excelled in leadership. Snider found, however, that all four 
streams were limiting to a certain extent.40 He regarded the 
St. Louis Movement as unique; it would fill the void left by 
"the four imported elements"— elements which "our president 
Brokmeyer, himself a German, branded as negative--hostile to 
all positive thought and intentions."41 Again, note the 
dialectic.
Although Snider defined the St. Louis Movement as the 
fifth cultural element in St. Louis, it was by nature closest 
to the already existent German element. Because the St.
16
Louis Movement consisted of poetry and art in addition to 
philosophy, a German connection was ensured. Hegel, Goethe, 
and Beethoven, after all, proved that the “Age's 
Genius...spoke German.”42 Srider further integrated the two 
by writing that the rise of St. Louis as a German city 
paralleled the “Great Illusion’* of the St. Louis Movement.
He said that this was no accident, for the two were
jksymptomatic of the same larger energy. ‘ The postwar St. 
Louis city council was almost completely German, and German 
was taught in all of the public schools.44 Snider wrote:
This upburst and domination of Germanism.... I followed 
it not from the cutside but from the inside; I not only 
studied it as an object, but felt it and appropr ioted it
till it became a part of myself. And there were many
natives here like me— many who experienced it as the 
uplift of a new strange spirit...as the revelation of 
the peculiar racial consciousness of old Teutonia 
welling forth just now on the banks of the 
Mississippi.45
Although Snider had warm feelings for the Germans, he 
nevertheless insisted that the St. Louis Movement was 
conceived by Americans for America.46 In a passing 
complaint, Snider commented that the English-speaking part of 
St. Louis took little enough notice of the Hegelians as it 
was; to have allied themselves any more closely with the 
Germans would have proved foolhardy.47
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The Issue of Eastern Influence: Harris vs. Brokmeyer
When Snider compared Harris and Brokmeyer at that 
propitious meeting in 1865, he singled out for emphasis a 
single trait, Harris's eastern roots. "Very decided was his 
Yankee intonation of speech," Snider wrote. "Harris was 
never able to get rid of this peculiar streak in his 
pronunciation, in his character and in his thinking; no 
wonder that some years later he fled back to his symphonious 
New England out of the discordant West."48 Harris had been 
born in 1835 into an affluent Connecticut family, and after 
attending Phillips Andover and then Yale, moved to St. Louis, 
arriving in 1857. No matter how much he had otherwise proven 
himself a devoted Hegelian, Snider maintained that Harris's 
eastern upbringing set him apart. He wrote that Harris never 
made the West his home, always intending to return to his 
"ideal Yankeeland."49 And, with exaggeration, Snider added 
that Harris never again surpassed his literary productivity 
while in St. Louis. Snider's test was mainly philosophical, 
for Harris was conseguently distinguished in education, 
serving as U.S. Commissioner of Education from 1889 to 
1906.50 Snider's Hegelian system was associated with a 
western identity, and any easterner, no matter how well 
intentioned, could not fully participate.
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Snider was a little more forgiving toward Brokmeyer, 
whom he referred to as ”genius unharnessed.”51 Brokmeyer 
emigrated to the United States in 1844 at age sixteen, and 
became in guick succession a bootblack, currier, tanner, and 
shoemaker, even owning slaves. After a short spell at Brown 
University, where he was exposed to the Transcendentalists, 
Brokmeyer left the East to go live in a cabin in Warren 
County, Missouri. Snider was rather proud of Brokmeyer's 
first flight from civilization, for he said that what the 
Transcendentalists only spoke, Brokmeyer had been unafraid to 
live. But the truth was that Brokmeyer left for the West 
both because of his desire to live in communion with nature 
and because a business venture had failed and he was 
insolvent. In 1856, Harris and others financed Brokmeyer's 
return to the city, where he worked as a mechanic and 
philosopher. His forceful personality provided much of the 
energy behind the movement. And where Harris was the 
“yankee,” Brokmeyer would always be the quintessential 
Westerner, whose informal ways and demonic energy shocked 
even Snider at their first meeting: ”1 looked upon him as a
ruie, self-taught specimen of the wild west.”52 In later 
life, Brokmeyer left St. Louis, with Snider writing: ”Once
at Muscogee in the Indian Territory I heard him explaining 
the deeper philosophy of deer-stalking in a pow-wow with some 
Creek Indians.”53
As a result of Harris's coaxing, the Concord School of 
Philosophy was formed with the expressed intent of uniting 
the eastern and western movements. Every summer from 1879 to 
1888, philosophers would gather, at the beginning to hear 
Jones and Harris debate the merits of Plato and Hegel. But 
while the early years were exciting contests between the neo- 
Platonists and the Hegelians, interest waned.54 All of the 
original Transcendentalists were by this point too old to 
participate, and Snider soon concluded that "The Mississippi 
could not be made to flow eastward through New England.”55
19
&n .Oh io .He g e l ia n
Johann Bernhard Stallo was born in the village of 
Sierhausen in Oldenburg, Germany in 1823. As his was a 
family of teachers, Stallo's education began early, with his 
grandfather tutoring him in Greek, Latin, and English, and 
his father instructing him in math. Heinrich A. Rattermann, 
Stallo's biographer and himself a prodigious German-American 
esSayis^ that the philosopher's education did not
suffer for lack of French language instruction, for although 
his grandfather "hated the French with his whole soul,”5  ^
Stallo learned French surreptitiously from his father. 
Already a promising scholar, at age fifteen Stallo entered a
20
normal school at Vechta and concurrently attended the 
gymnasium, where he was first exposed to the idealism of 
Kant.
Since Stallo's family did not have the money to send him 
to a German university, stallo, determined not to be another 
teacher, emigrated in 1839 to Cincinnati, where his uncle 
owned a printing business. Stallo's first American job was 
as a school teacher, an irony that Rattermann could not 
resist noting. He soon found a better position, however, as 
a German instructor at St. Xavier College, and continued his 
study of math and Greek in his spare time. In 1844, Stallo 
began teaching math exclusively; this work led him to his 
next job as a professor of physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics at St. John's College in Fordham, New York. In 
1848, while still at St. John's, Stallo published The General 
Principles of the Philosophy of Nature. As this book 
received little notice, Stallo, perhaps discouraged, gave up 
writing and returned to Cincinnati to begin a new career as a 
lawyer. When Rattermann asked him why he did not continue 
his more theoretical pursuits, Stallo answered, MI wanted to 
be practical like the Americans are.1,57 stallo displayed a 
life-long consciousness of the relationship between national 
identity and human spirit, a very Hegelian notion.
21
Stallo's ”011101001031 Revelries11
Unlike Snider, Stallo never applied Hegel specifically 
to any conception of civic destiny, but nonetheless made a 
thorough study of his philosophy his earliest avocation. And 
indeed, where Snider saw Hegel's potential to provide an 
external system to express the rapidly changing post-civil 
War West, Stallo was more interested in achieving a personal 
understanding of the development of Hegel's total system in 
relation to the German philosophers who came before him.
Stallo's 1848 book on the philosophy of nature was 
primarily an effort to place Hegel's system in the larger 
German context. The first portion was an exposition of the 
general principles involved in a philosophical study of the 
natural sciences, and the latter, a comparison of Schelling, 
Oken, and Hegel, with Kant included as **the acme of the old 
dualism.**58 Stallo wrote that he had probed deeply into 
Hegel, and, reflective of his personal search for a system, 
insisted that the ideas he ultimately presented were his 
own.59 Understandably, there were striking similarities 
between Stallo and Hegel. Stallo wrote, **The fundamental 
principle, upon which, according to my conviction, all true 
philosophy of nature rests, is, that the different 
manifestations of the vitality which bursts forth in nature's 
phenomena are comprehensively united, centered in the
22
mind.1*60 Hegel had similarly said that unity could be found 
in the self-mediated, in the Spirit. Stallo, like Hegel, saw 
the Whole reflected in every part, and also believed in 
spiral development.61
But if a study of the connection between philosophy and 
science remained Stallo's chief personal interest, he did not 
by any means confine himself to an empirical examination of 
nature. Stallo's primary motive in publishing his General 
Principles was to introduce the German idealists to the 
American public. "The words, 'German philosophy,' or 'German 
idealism,' are heard every moment," Stallo wrote, "but the 
only sense attached to them (if there be any) is a medley of 
vague abstractions, or a series of distractive day-dreams." 
Stallo continued, "The Germans could not descend to the 
material world; hence they became idealists;— the English 
and French were unable to ascend to the summits of the 
Absolute; on that account they remained materialists."62 
Stallo would provide the Americans with step-by-step 
instructions for scaling the summit if they could but devote 
the necessary time and energy to the project.63
Even though Stallo later recanted much of his earlier 
dependency on Hegelian metaphysics, he never wavered from his 
contention that the Germans would play a leading role in the 
development of an appropriate American philosophy. In a 
series of speeches delivered to German audiences over a
thirty-year period, Stallo implicitly tied Hegel to the 
American West, if not by name, then certainly through his 
repeated assertions that a German philosophical system was 
essential to the development of the country. If Snider's 
mission had been to appropriate an Hegelian-based identity 
for the West, then Stallo's task was to insist that part of 
this identity be German.
Thomas Jefferson: Stallo's Anglo-German Synthesis
On March 2, 1855, the anniversary of Thomas Jefferson's 
inauguration as president of the United States, Stallo 
delivered an address that reflected the Hegelian orientation 
he envisioned for America. He began by comparing the 
evolution of America with that of the European states, 
specifically France. When Stallo stated that the struggle 
between England and America during the revolution was quite 
simply the struggle between the Old World and the New, he, 
like countless Americans, was reciting an age-old litany. 
Hegel himself wrote in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History that MIt is for America to abandon the ground on 
which hitherto the History of the World has developed 
itself.1,64 That Stallo still believed at this time in a 
Hegelian spiral development is clear through his statement
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that "the past can exert no power over the present? every 
age makes its own rules."0*-*
But acknowledging difference was not yet evidence of any 
system-building, or "systematicity," and Stallo proceeded to 
illustrate just how important he felt a system to be. 
Jefferson, he noted, was not to be lauded because of his 
accomplishments in general, although they were manifold, but 
rather for one accomplishment in particular: he raised the
revolutionary issue from one of nation versus nation to one 
of principle. Jefferson was noteworthy precisely because he 
made a conscious effort to integrate values and action, and 
in this process a philosophic system was essential. In this 
early speech Stallo was in complete harmony with Hegel, 
because Hegel himself had suggested that if the revolution 
had been fought on less than the principle of independence, 
the outcome may have differed.66 There could be no 
underestimation of the power of an idea.
So America was unique, and was expanding. Just as 
Snider's St. Louis had looked to itself for guidance, so 
Stallo's America would, and yet America could not simply 
expand without some inner sense of unity, some self-imposed 
system. It would be in the imposition of this system, in the 
implementation of a philosophy, stallo suggested, that the 
Germans could make their greatest contribution. Jefferson 
was Stallo's representative American because he embodied both
’’Anglo” and MG6rmanM values* Stallo, in fact, often made a 
distinction between the two, and illustrated it by relating 
the story of the Anglo-American and the German-American who 
were both told to dig a well. While the Anglo immediately 
asked how deep, and set off to work, the German became lost 
in the implications of creating nothingness out of existence, 
and was literally paralyaed by the thought of measuring the 
absence of space.6; It was not that the Anglo-American had 
no principles, but rather that the German spent more time 
discerning exactly what the proper principles should v^ e.
In what would become a recurring theme, Stallo stated 
that freedom of thought was to the Germans the most important 
right, and indeed an integral part of the German spirit. For 
the English and the French, he said, this freedom was far 
less important.68 Thus did Stallo call upon his German 
brothers to rise up to defend Jefferson's principles, which 
were coming under attack from the ’’Puritan” establishment,
”The idea of a republic to the Americans is essentially one 
of the police state? the government is everything, the 
people nothing; the individual is, thanks to our Maine Laws 
and similar statutes, neither free in his home nor in his 
person.”69 It is tempting to see this speech as an 
embodiment of the Hegelian dialectic, for this Anglo-German 
conflict would be expected to yield a greater American 
synthesis. If it might be reaching to attribute Stallo's
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structure to Hegel's triadic dialectic, however, it is no 
stretch to note that where the Anglo-Americans may not have 
viewed the German element as essential to American 
development, Stallo evidently thought it crucial.
A German Philosophy for America
Rattermann became a close friend of Stalic's in the 
philosopher's later years, and encouraged him to publish some 
of the speeches that he had given to the German Turnvereine 
in Cincinnati over the course of almost three decades. The
resulting Reden, Abhandlungen, und Briefen (1893) is an
amalgam of Stallo's varied interests, ranging from the 
strictly philosophical, as in his critique of materialists in 
"Der Materialisinus” (1855) , to the social, as in a commentary 
on the separation of church and state in "Das Bibeilesen in 
den Staatsschulen" (1870). In one speech, Stallo lauded the 
German naturalist Alexander von Humboldt (1859), and in 
another, "Die englische Sprache" (1870), he even hazarded an 
examination of the connection between language and national 
character.
Because Stallo wrote all of these speeches for a general 
audience and thus did not employ the complex metaphysical 
terminology that had made both of his books relatively 
inaccessible, these papers provide valuable evidence for his
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idea of an external American philosophical system. As Snider 
had done for St. Louis, so too had Stallo presented a Hegel 
for public consumption. Like Snider, Stallo celebrated the 
uniqueness of America and called progress a basic identity. 
But this progress needed direction, and a philosophical 
articulation of it would therefore be essential. But where 
Snider saw a Hegelian-based system emerging from the genius 
of the West, Stallo pointed to German culture to supply the 
appropriate philosophy. And where Snider celebrated the West 
and made veiled criticisms of the East, Stallo lauded the 
Germans and censured the dominant Anglo-American culture. 
Although Stallo was speaking to a German audience and could 
therefore be expected to have adopted a pro-German stance, 
his acceptance in the Anglo-American community indicates that 
he was no radical and that his grievances were valid.
Stallo's philosophical system for America took much from 
Hegel and some from Humboldt. In his speech on Humboldt, 
Stallo said, "The world of ideas constructs the foundation 
for an entirely new outlook on life.”70 And reminiscent of 
Hegel, Stallo continued, "every experience of the scientist, 
every phenomenon that he makes subordinate to a general rule, 
i a contribution to the life history of the Whole.1*71 
Stallo said that Humboldt did not obtain a result and then 
stop his questioning, but rather treated each new finding as 
a step in the contingjpg process of a greater understanding,
a s
a spiral development.72 Although by this point Stallo had 
already denounced Hegel as being too metaphysical, and had 
appropriately transferred his admiration to Humboldt, the 
scientist and the philosopher seemed to share the same 
values.73 In other words, Hegel by any other name was still 
the same.
The philosophical system that Stallo envisioned for 
America incorporated Hegelian elements, and to him, Hegelian 
philosophy was indivisible from the greater German spirit 
that had given it life. Stallo, like Snider, believed that 
the "Age's Genius... spoke German." To Stallo it was thus 
symbolic that both Humboldt and Hegel were born within a year 
of one another.74 Humboldt was:
a German, not because his cradle stood under German sky, 
but because his spirit was German. Humboldt could only 
have emerged from the people for whom Kant and Hegel 
philosophized and Schiller and Goethe poetized, and only 
these people recognized in Humboldt's perception and 
ideas the form of their own spirit.75
An Anglo-American appreciation of the German cultural 
element would be essential to America's healthy philosophical 
development, for the philosophy best-suited to America was 
German. And indeed, Stallo's frequent attacks against 
"Anglo" values do not seem misplaced when viewed in the 
context of his battle to keep German values from 
disappearing. In his "Bibellesen" speech, for instance,
stallo complained that, "Behind the school teacher...stands 
the entire force of Puritan fanaticism, which even today 
usurps the law, and constricts our social and political 
life.”76 Stallo's championing of German ideals extended to 
his comparison of the German and English language in his 
essay "Die englische Sprache." The English mind, he 
contended, was not concerned with the ideal.
The highest principle of their morals is that the 
purpose of all human striving is for power and wealth, 
and that these ends make all means holy; the first 
axiom of their philosophy is that nothing has a real or 
ideal meaning unless it can be entered in a business 
account book.77
It followed naturally that the English language was filled 
with short words, as if to speak was to detract from business 
time. The German language, on the other hand, was rich with 
meaning, and reflective of the German character. "The German 
expression,” Stallo remarked, "is heart-felt and full of 
meaning, like the German disposition.”78 And furthermore, 
the German language was better equipped to handle 
philosophical discussions. Harris was by no means the first 
American to have had difficulties in "making Hegel speak 
English.''79 It was not only a matter of Hegel's dense 
configuration of thoughts, but also that the English 
language, unlike the German, could not make processes the 
subjects of actions. Where the German could say "das
30
Warden,” ”das Leben,” and "das Lieben,” his English 
counterpart could only say "the process of becoming,” "the 
process of living,” and "the process of loving.”80 As 
Hegel's traidic dialectic turned on the process of becoming, 
this was understandably no small deficiency.
By the time Stallo published his last strictly 
philosophical work, Concepts and Theories, he had recanted 
much of General Principles, published when he was only 
twenty-five:
That book was was written while 1 was under the spell of 
Hegel's ontological revelries— at a time when I was 
barely of age and still seriously affected with the 
metaphysical malady which seems to be one of the 
unavoidable disorders of intellectual infancy.*
And indeed, Stallo's disenchantment with the promises of 
Hegel was not unique among American Hegelians. Hegel was 
optimistic and idealistic, but, in important ways, simply 
incomprehensible. Even Emerson, exemplar of an another 
idealistic tradition, had cautioned the members of the St. 
Louis Philosophical Society in 1867, "the hideous skeleton of 
philosophy [should] be covered with beautiful living tissue,*
I do not enjoy for my intellectual repast the dry bones of 
thought."82
In fact, all who studied Hegel with the intention of 
formulating a popular American system eventually realized 
that German idealism was ill-suited to the American 
experience. Westerners, no longer grappling with the meaning 
of the Civil War, were increasingly absorbed by the demands 
of the present, and had little time for philosophizing.
Snider even deserted his HFuture Great City of the World'1 to 
migrate to, of all places, Chicago. When Stallo wrote that 
"The English are no metaphysicians,"83 he might just as well 
have meant the Americans. "Anglo" values had remained 
dominant in American life, and a German philosophy like 
Hegel's which was so enmeshed in German culture would never 
achieve a lasting following. By the late nineteenth century, 
American intellectuals were already espousing Pragmatism as 
better tailored to the American spirit. Even Brokmeyer, the 
quintessential western exponent of German metaphysics as an 
appropriate American philosophy, wrote of his translation of 
Hegel's Larger Logic:
Just leave it in the attic for the vermin? I have 
enjoyed every minute of my life devoted to it, in the 
hope that I might justify my existence by leaving 
something to posterity worth-while, but apparentlyfithere 
is no demand for anything like that at this time."84
As Hegel's LargerLogic was destined to reside in a pile of 
old clothing and discarded goods in Brokmeyer's attic, so too 
was his philosophy soon relegated to the back of the American 
mind.
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